Telecommunications Policy

This paper considers whether common national standards for determining participants' eligibility and designating service providers in the Lifeline program are preferable to a decentralized system where state utility commissions have greater influence over these program parameters. Two recent decisions of the Federal Communications Commission, a 2016 Order and its reversal in March 2017, on the designation of Eligible Telecommunications Carriers to provide broadband Lifeline service, centered on this question.

In recent years, the Federal Communications Commission has become a microcosm of the political battles in Congress. The Democratic-controlled Wheeler Commission entitled its Net Neutrality Order “Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet.” Not to be outdone, the Republican-controlled Pai Commission that overturned that Order entitled its own “Restoring `Internet Freedom.” And like Congressional pronouncements, Commissioners look to grab headlines with dramatic statements of impending doom if their policies are not enacted.

Drawing on the increasing body of literature on policy stakeholders and the ever-growing acknowledgement that communication policy is crafted by more than just parliamentarians and formal communication regulators this paper examines the role that another set of regulators plays in communication policy: agriculture regulators. Based on a study of the United States Department of Agriculture's Rural Utilities Service (RUS), this paper explores alternative agents of communication policy.

As participation in society becomes largely dependent on use of internet-enabled technologies, internet non-users may seek alternative ways of using the internet. Proxy internet use (PIU), where internet non-users ask internet users to perform online activities on their behalf, is a strategy for obtaining (indirect) internet access.

An economic assessment of zero-rating offers in the context of mobile internet access services and draw six lessons: